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Colloquy
on
Complex Litigation
It has been ten years since Benjamin Kaplan, past reporter
to the Advisory Committee on Federal Civil Rules, suggested
that "the drive toward a unitary procedure be abated" and that
"special procedures be set up that are better accomodated to the
intrinsic qualities of problems presented."'
Professor Kaplan's suggestions are representative of a
movement in the profession toward specialized treatment of
complex cases-a movement whose impact is considerable, as
evidenced by the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation. Nonetheless, identifying the "intrinsic qualities of
problems presented'' and fashioning procedures to respond to
these problems are tasks that remain with us.
In an effort to address these tasks, four distinguished scholars-one judge and three lawyers-met at J. Reuben Clark Law
School. They discussed problems presented by complex litigation. They examined causes of the problems and explored solutions. What follows is an edited transcript of their discussion.
Participants:
Alvin B. Rubin, Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Francis R. Kirkham; Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro. A.B., 1930,
LL.B., 1931, George Washington University.
Weyman I. Lundquist; Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe.
A.B., 1952, Dartmouth College; LL.B., 1955,
Harvard University.
1. Kaplan, An American Lawyer in the Queen's Courts: Impressions of English
Court Procedure, 69 MICH.L. REV.821,845 (1971).

742

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I981

Jerrold E. Salzman; Freeman, Rothe, Freeman & Salzman.
A.B., 1962, University of Michigan;
J.D., 1965, Harvard University.
In order for us to establish a common foundation, I
think that the first question we ought to examine
is, What is a complex case?
Salzman:
A complex case is most often defined by the inertia
of the parties and the court.
Lundquist : That would be my first observation. One cannot
identify a complex case by its subject matter or by
the court that it is in. We have talked in Washington about identifying a complex case, either by instinct or by use of Justice Department statistics.
We have been able to adduce no guidelines that reveal what a complex case is, except for a notion
that lawyers involved in antitrust think antitrust
cases are complicated-a self-fulfilling prophecy.
I think we have two overlapping concepts. First, the
Rubin:
complex case: cases that have complicated subject
matter. Rule lob-5 cases with issues of scienter and
reliance, patent cases with numerous defenses and
claims, and certain antitrust cases are complex by
virtue of the subject matter. They are just hard to
understand. Second, the protracted case. The subject matter may not be particularly complicated,
but the case involves a lot of parties, or the amount
at stake is very large, and the case goes on a long
time. Sometimes the two overlap, resulting in a
complex, protracted case. I don't find it very useful
to distinguish the complex case from the protracted
case. Viewing them as a single class-the difficult
case-is a simpler concept.
Kirkham: I agree with Judge Rubin. There are complex cases,
and these cases require special treatment. They
should be designated as complex and treated as
complex from the outset.
I agree that to avoid problems, certain cases should
Salzman:
get special treatment. However, I am not certain
that such treatment is required by the nature of
the case. For example, the most complicated cases
Kirkham:
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that we see in our office are roof collapse cases.
They present engineering problems, architectural
problems, and use problems. There are many parties-steel manufacturers, the fabricator, the contractor, the subcontractor, etc. This list assumes
that no one was killed or injured when the roof collapsed. We do, however, have to face all issues arising out of the interruption of an ongoing business.
These cases are very complex. However, the bar
that handles them, for historical or other reasons,
doesn't act like the antitrust bar. The cases get
treated in an expeditious manner-both by the
lawyers and the parties. I have found that although
the roof collapse case is much more complicated
than the average antitrust case, the roof collapse
case proceeds through discovery stages
expeditiously.
Lundquist: I agree that there are cases with complex subject
matter. However, there are also lawyers who enjoy
a certain mystique by making a case complex; they
like to speak the language of their case. The patent
bar does this. A federal district court judge in San
Francisco recently complained to me about a complex patent case. The judge was outraged because
neither he nor the jury could understand the case.
The expert attorneys and the expert witnesses were
speaking only to each other and ignoring everyone
else.
Is there any reason to treat differently the case that
Rubin:
is complicated because it is difficult to understand
from the case that is protracted because the lawyers or parties are very difficult to deal with?
Salzman:
I think so; I think that one ought to allow
complicated cases to proceed without interference,
but the potentially protracted case should be eontrolled from the outset and should be subject to
discovery restrictions.
How would you distinguish the case that ought to
Rubin:
be controlled from the case that should be permitted to go its own way? Who would identify the
case? How would they identify it? How would the
case be treated differently from the complicated
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case?
Salzman:
Experience has taught all of us some answers.
Large antitrust cases with class action aspects
(price-fixing cases), regardless of their inherent
simplicity, often become cumbersome. In such a
case, it is in the defendant's interest to protract the
litigation, either to wear down the plaintiff or to get
the benefit of holding expensive money for as long
as possible prior to settlement. Most defendants
think they will eventually settle the case, and because they don't expect to lose anything from delay, they protract. In large class action antitrust
cases we can predict that undue delay will occur.
Lundquist: I think Jerry is correct. Very often, a case is
designedly made complex because it is in the interest of one party or the other to make it so. To
achieve wear-down exposure, bring a lot of people
in. If the attorney wants to assert that the case is
beyond the grasp of jurors, he goes in every direction to make the case inordinately complex. The
other side seeks to keep it simple. Ours is an adversary system; we respect and understand these
processes. Over the years, depending on the interest
I have had for a client, I have gone in one direction
or the other.
Kirkham: I think that we are describing a situation that was.
I think that everyone is completely fed up with the
big case and its excessive discovery and expense.
The plaintiff bar and the defense bar are beginning
to recognize that both sides are responsible to see
that simple cases do not become complex and that
complex cases do not become more complex.
Rubin:
There is something implicit in our discussion that I
would like to make explicit to see if we all agree.
Are we not saying that the lawyers, through experience, know whether a case requires special treatment, and that such a case cannot be identified
from reading the complaint?
Salzman:
Certain categories of cases are likely to be
protracted-antitrust cases, certain types of lob-5
actions, and so forth. Beyond that, the lawyer will
frequently recognize an interest in the opponent to

7411

COMPLEX LITIGATION

745

protract.
What you are saying then is that the plaintiff or the
Rubin:
defendant will recognize, from their interaction,
that the case will become a protracted case.
Lundquist: I think that is right. I cannot resist saying that we
have a mechanism in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that deals with this problem. The new
procedures in rule 26(f) place the responsibility on
the lawyers to determine how the case should be
handled and to resolve difficulties. If the attorneys
cannot resolve the differences, one or both of them
can call for a judicial conference and obtain judicial
management. The hope is that 26(0 will enable the
lawyers to manage the case without judicial involvement; but, if they cannot do it, 26(f) permits
early intervention in the protracted case.
Salzman: I think that 26(f) will work unless both parties have
an interest in protracting the litigation. There has
to be one side that needs action and feels that the
protraction of litigation will injure his client in order for the device to work.
Kirkham: I agree. Tom Barf said this not long ago when he
was reviewing his IBM cases: One person cannot
keep a case from being complex but any two can. If
you have one lawyer and a judge, or two lawyers,
who want the issues framed and the case reduced
to size and brought to trial, it can be done. With
respect to the complicated case, I don't think that
anyone has a right to file a lawsuit and then just
kick it along forever until it is an untriable case.
The judge has to have some responsibility for the
case; lawyers can work together, but there ought to
be a report as the case goes along to enable the
judge to know whether the case is being handled
properly.
The discussion indicates that good judicial
Rubin:
management resolves some of the problems
presented by protracted litigation, and that rule
26(f) provides a mechanism to obtain such management. As I understand it, there are two situations
2. Thomas D. Barr; Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York, New York.
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in which 26(f) would not be triggered: the multidistrict case and the case in which both sides have an
interest in delay. In those situations in which there
is a public interest in obtaining judicial management, but neither party sees a need to trigger 26(f),
what do we do to identify the case and subject it to
judicial management?
Lundquist: I would want to think a while about what those
cases might be. It is the lawyer's responsibility to
handle his client's interests. If both lawyers determine that judicial intervention is not desirable, the
case will probably proceed better without judicial
intervention than it would with such intervention
over the objections of both sides. At the same time,
I realize that there are cases that are put on the
back burner and allowed to drift along, to the detriment of the client's interests. Many of these are not
complex cases, so I don't view them as the result of
lawyer-designed protraction. I think that the ordinary mechanism of status conferences, in which the
judge says, "Where are you?" "Where are you going?" "I want to get this case off my calendar
within a certain period of time," is adequate to
overcome most of the problems.
Rubin:
Are you saying that, if all the parties agree that the
case ought to be a donnybrook and ought to be
fought the way World War I was fought, with tremendous sacrifices of men and materials, with barrages that continue for ten years, then the case
should be permitted to go that way?
Lundquist: No. We have procedures by which the judge comes
in every six months and asks, "Where are you?" If
he sees that the case is out of hand he can certainly
get into the picture.
Rubin:
One thing that I strongly feel is that once the case
gets out of hand, the judge cannot restore order.
I've tried. The cases that I did not succeed in managing as a trial judge escaped control when I let the
case get too big. It's almost impossible to get the
genie back into the bottle. I don't think you can
rely on the notion, "Well the case has gone two
years and has gotten out of hand; judge, come in

7411

COMPLEX LITIGATION

747

and save it."
Lundquist: That may be, but on the other hand, I have seen
judges come in and activate cases too quickly, making a morass of cases that the lawyers would have
handled well. I think there is no complete answer;
it may become a question of the judge's confidence
in the attorneys and the attorneys' confidence in
the judge. There is a chemistry that I don't think
the rules can define or provide.
Rubin:
The existence of any system, however, depends on
more than a visceral, intuitive judgment that this is
the right kind of judge who can do something, and
this is the wrong kind of judge who can't do anything. If we are to propose any systemic kind of
help, then we have to have some device that recognizes what kind of case it is that needs help, what
kind of help can be given, who should help, and
how that person is selected.
Salzman:
The original question regarding judicial
management without the request of either party assumes that there is some public interest in disposing of a case promptly or efficiently, even though
the lawyers on both sides seem to be content with
the progress they are making. I am afraid that I
cannot identify that interest. I can identify an interest in not having an overcrowded docket, but I
think that we are taking care of that.
I don't see any public interest in an uncrowded
Rubin:
docket. But don't you think that there is a public
interest in litigation that is not unduly expensive?
If we make it apparent that when one party feels
Salzman:
the court's intervention is necessary for efficient,
expeditious litigation, that party can invoke judicial
intervention, then we have met that interest.
Kirkham: I don't like to be a Cassandra, but if more is not
done to reduce the expense of litigation, the legal
profession will be destroyed. If the courts of this
country cannot handle litigation at a reasonable expense, then some substitute mechanism for dispute
settling will be needed. Judge Rifkinds said that if
3. Simon H. Rifkind; Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, New York, New
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he had a friend who had a claim for anything less
than $50,000, he would advise him to forget it
rather than file suit in federal court.
We often tell people to forget lawsuits because it
will cost too much. There can be a legitimate interest in proceeding slowly, however, even though this
raises costs. For example, in a class action antitrust
case the class attorneys may have some interest in
going slowly-it is difficult for them to organize,
and they are overburdened by the talent and effort
that the defense attorneys can put into the case.
The defense is interested in going slowly because
the money is in their pocket, and the interest rate
is very high. The defendants may be earning four
times as much in interest as they are paying their
attorneys. Therefore, although the eventual disposition of the case is clear to both parties from the
outset-settlement-both
parties are content to go
slowly.
I still think that there may be a public interest in
judicial management of the case even when it is in
the interest of both sides not to act precipitately
with respect to discovery and trial. I think that the
public interest exists because, as assumed in your
hypothetical, we have a class action. Notice has
gone out to a lot of people who won't be hearing
anything about the case, and they will be concerned: "What is happening in my case? I've got a
right to know this; I'm a member of the class. I
haven't heard anything for six months or a year."
Another thing that happens in these cases is that,
although the attorneys are satisfied with the progress, at a later stage of the case the public becomes aware of the action and views the case as being typical of the judicial process. Suppose the case
took four years to conclude and ended up being settled. Nothing much is visible on the public record
in terms of judicial proceedings despite the tremendous discovery and negotiation efforts. Suddenly,
there is a request for $750,000 in attorney fees. The
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public doesn't understand. For these reasons I
think there is a public interest in having such a
case under management even if the management
consists of getting everyone together and finding
out that attorney X, who represents the plaintiff
class, is conscientious and is going forth as well as
the case permits, and attorney Y, who represents
the defendants, is not unduly dilatory. Thus, even
in the case that doesn't require active management
by the court in the sense of compulsory grooves,
there is an interest in early identification of the
case and some kind of judicial proceeding that will
let the lawyers know that they have an obligation
other than what they perceive to be the interest of
their client.
Lundquist: You state a valid public interest. But I think that
there is another public interest in judicial management. In the context of protracted litigation, the
lawyers arguably are working in a conflict of interest situation. The plaintiff lawyer who prolongs a
case is justifying a fee for himself. At the same
time, the defense lawyer is being paid on an hourly
basis. I think that one of the leading conflict of interest situations of our day arises in the context of
the hourly charge and the possibility of making a
case protracted. Lawyers should be very sensitive to
this. The conflict is such that it behooves the judiciary, in the public's interest, to be concerned. As
to how to handle the case, I think it perfectly respectable for a judge to say, "I am going to have
this case off my docket in two years and you ought
to plan accordingly.'' Let the lawyers work within
that. As long as the time frame established by the
judge is reasonable, this type of intervention is
proper. Of course, if something unforeseen comes
up, one would expect the judge to be reasonable.
Kirkham: Perhaps we should change our focus and discuss
the next question on the outline: What can be done
before a complaint is filed to avoid delay and
expense?
One factor is the extent of precomplaint investigation done by the plaintiff. In general, there are
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two situations with regard to precomplaint work.
One is government-initiated litigation; the other is
private litigation. There is no excuse for the government to bring an action without knowing what
the issues are. In government actions, discovery
should be very specific and controlled because the
government has ample opportunity to obtain evidence before the case is filed. Before filing a case,
the government should know what it will do. Such
was not the case in the AT&T case,' the IBM case:
the Cereal litigation,' or the FTC-Exxon case.' In
the Exxon case the government filed a thirteen-volume, 1400-page demand subpoena. The administrative law judge remonstrated and said, "Go back and
rethink it. If you can't file a discovery motion that
looks toward a case that is triable, then you better
look again." The judge was correct; there's no excuse for such conduct.
Now in the private case, because the private
litigant does not have the right to go into the books
of the potential defendant, the plaintiff has more of
a problem, and discovery after the filing of a case is
legitimately broader than it is in the governmentinitiated case. However, one of the biggest
problems we have in complex cases is that a plaintiff can file a case under Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that doesn't state any issue at all. Class action cases are the worst manifestation of this problem. The minute there is any rumor of a government investigation, lawyers jump in
all over the country creating a most ridiculous situation. The Sugar cases are a good example. More
than one hundred lawsuits with millions upon millions of sugar users as class members were filed all
over the country against practically every sugar
4. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 74-1698 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 20,
1978).
5. United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., No. 69-200 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Jan. 17, 1969).
6. Kellogg Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, No. 8883 (filed Apr. 26, 1972; dismissed
Sept. 10, 1981).
7. Exxon v. Federal Trade Comm'n, No. 8934 (filed July 18, 1973).
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company in the nation, charging a nationwide conspiracy extending over half a century. When the indictment finally came down in New York, it
charged four companies with a specific price-fixing
arrangement arising from a single incident. In the
meantime, every issue in the world had been
thrown at the industry.
Salzman: Our office has withdrawn from the class action
antitrust practice for reasons you mentioned. We
found that lawyers were spending forty percent of
their time jockeying for position and very little of
their time working on preparation of the case.
The problem of issue identification is real but
arises from inherent difficulties. A plaintiffs attorney, approached by a client, will make a preliminary investigation by appealing to a distributor or a
person who was formerly in the industry. If the attorney is given compelling information, he is put in
a bind. He has a duty at some point to file the case
and stop the statute of limitations. How much
prefiling investigation can be done without compromising the damage claim?
Rubin:
And I think there are other cases. Let's take the
typical class action racial discrimination case. It's
very hard to find out until after discovery, which is
not available before filing, whether there really was
racial discrimination. All the data are in the hands
of your opponent. The plaintiffs give a plausible account of racial discrimination by their employer.
These accounts make a credible class action, but
the lawyer has no way to tell what the hiring policy
was because no one will talk to him. Doesn't the
plaintiffs' lawyer have a duty to file his suit and at
least find out?
Kirkham: But in that case he will have specific issues, he will
have plaintiffs, and he will be able to state something other than "These defendants have violated
the law."
Lundquist: Perhaps not. I know of one discrimination case in
which the complaint was a notice-pleading complaint that alleged discrimination and even went on
to suggest the particulars. The defendant said, "We
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absolutely haven't so discriminated and we'll prove
it to you." In the course of discovery the defendants gave the plaintiffs computer records of employee hiring. The documents showed that the defendants had not discriminated in the way alleged
but had discriminated in another way. Except for
notice pleading the discrimination would have
never come to the fore. I certainly favor notice
pleading, but I think that problems may arise after
the case gets started on the notice pleading because
the interest of one party or the other may be to
make discovery explosive, to make it complicated,
or to go far beyond the noticed claim, rather than
to focus in on it. I feel very strongly that, after the
case gets started and after a reasonable amount of
discovery, the lawyers should start to focus on the
issues to ready the case for trial.
Is there not another factor that causes protracted
Rubin:
litigation? That is, don't people who handle major
issues in litigation have a sort of malpractice syndrome, not directly in terms of malpractice, but
rather an anxiety that unless they turn over every
stone, they will not be doing their professional
duty. It's not a matter of self-aggrandizement;
they're not trying to run up the clock; they really
are concerned that they must turn over every stone.
Lundquist: I don't entirely agree that it doesn't tend to be running the clock; but to refer back to what we have
said, in some cases we use that justification to avoid
making judgments. When you are looking for
worms in a field and you know that they're found
only among stones where there's moisture, looking
in the dry area is not good judgment; you must remember that what you're out to do is not to turn
over every stone in the field, but to find worms. We
can eliminate some of the problem by insisting that
lawyers focus on the issues. We are not teaching
our young lawyers to be trial lawyers. We're teaching them-and
you hear this more and
more-always to overprepare. I think Judge Pat
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Higginbotham8 has said that overpreparedness can
be as much of if not more of a problem than underpreparedness, because laywers coming into a courtroom don't know how to bring a case to trial.
This problem exists in many of the cases in which
we are involved. In part, the problem arises from
client demands in a situation where there is much
at stake. That client says, "Damn the torpedos, full
speed ahead. Who knows, something might come
up." In many cases, we have said to the client,
"Don't do it; it's going to be counterproductive," or
"It will give you one-tenth of one percent return on
your money.'' The clients have told us to go ahead.
What has happened throughout the profession is
that the example of New York law firms operating
in this fashion has spread to the hinterlands. The
next thing you know you're down in Atlanta, and
somebody in Atlanta is trying to prove that he is as
good as the people in New York. All of the business
is moving down there anyway, and the clients are
used to the "no stone unturned" principle. In this
way it becomes a practice in litigation departments
of major firms to operate on the leave-no-stone-unturned principle. The habit extends right down to
the behavior at trial.
Sometimes the defense cannot afford to leave any
stone unturned, especially in light of notice pleadfor examing. In the Little Mother Hubbard case,@
ple, the government brought suit to divest the oil
industry of its vertical holdings. When the government brings that kind of a case, the stakes are so
high you can't afford to miss anything. In that case,
for instance, we had a study made of every independent oil refiner that went out of business on the
west coast between 1917 and 1930. At the outset
there were dozens and dozens, even scores of little
refineries; all one had to do was put up a tank, boil
the oil, take the gasoline off the top, and throw the

8. Patrick F. Higginbotham, United States District Judge for the Northern District
of Texas.
9. United States v. Standard Oil Co., No. 11584-C (S.D. Cal.).
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rest away. As things got more efficient, of course,
those refineries went out of existence. The government alleged that it was the result of a conspiracy,
that we had thrown all these people out of business.
So we made a survey to discover the reasons why
every one of those refiners went out of business.
And that was only one aspect of the refining issue.
The government would never confine the case and
tell us what the suit was all about.
Another problem arises when the government uses
Salzman:
the court to accomplish structural change that
ought to come through legislation. There has been a
tendancy in the Justice Department to use the judicial system for sweeping changes rather than to correct conduct recognized to be in violation of the
law. I don't think the judicial system is designed for
that, although it's had incredible success in certain
social areas.
Lundquist: I wonder if you're not going to get into the courts
one way or the other. Assume that to further a social policy a law is passed that prohibits companies
from employing more than X people or having
more than X billion dollars in assets. That legislation is going to be in litigation immediately, and
you're going to be back in the courts looking for
answers.
Let's discuss that. A bill of this type is pending
Salzman:
right now. Representative Neal Smith, of the House
Agricultural Committee, has proposed legislation to
restrict the size of packing houses and to limit the
way they feed cattle.1° The Justice Department reacted adversely, asserting that the legislation would
be anticompetitive. If the law is enacted, there is
likely to be litigation. But the litigation will be of a
different scope than litigation charging, for example, that the packing houses had a shared monopoly. When we deal with statutes, we focus on narrow standards for overturning overly restrictive
legislation.
10. Small Business Preservation and Protection Act, H.R. 7197, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., 126 CONG.REC.3073 (1980).
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Rubin:

That is true. When a statute is challenged, the
judge assumes a role that he more readily comprehends and for which he is better trained; the judge
determines whether the statute is constitutional-whether it violates due process or equal
protection or has some other defect.
Lundquist: But when the legislation makes reference to social
aims, and the court is left to "flesh-out" the details,
such as in the environmental area, the court again
becomes the arena for sweeping change. Furthermore, in my judgment, the courts have not done a
bad job.
I would like to address the statement made
that notice pleading is a cause of some problems in
complex cases. My view is that notice pleading remains a good thing. What happens after the notice
pleading is what becomes critical. It is a question of
which way you look through the telescope: Do you
look through the wide end so the case is perceived
broadly, or do you focus in to reduce the case to
triable issues? Something I have advocated-and I
think Justice Powell thought of this when he wrote
his dissent with Justices Rehnquist and Stewart regarding the recent federal rules changela-is that,
after the case gets started in the pleadings, discovery be limited to the claims or defenses at issue in
the case. That's the way I would like to see the
problem addressed.
Rubin:
How would you get the attorney to focus in on the
issues?
Salzman: I would force him to take a jury trial. The judge
should say, "I want you to start preparing your little fact booklet for the jury."
Lundquist: I couldn't agree more. I think that this touches
upon an integral cause of complex litigation
problems. If we look at those who are described as
litigators in this country, we will find very few trial
lawyers. The truth of the matter is that most big
firms try very few jury cases each year.
Rubin:
I agree with you. I ask people who say they're in
11. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521 (1980).

',
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the litigation section of X, Y & Z how many cases
they have tried in the last three years. It's not uncommon to find that the average will be five or six
per year.
Lundquist: That would be unusually high. I would guess that if
you were to poll litigation partners in major firms
around the country you would find that a number
of them have never tried a jury case. You would
find a number of them who have not tried a jury
case in ten years. This is part of the problem I previously alluded to in which the interests of the lawyers lie in making a case complex and in making it
remunerative.
Rubin:
I think I generally agree that in some cases the
judge ought to say, "This case is going to be set for
trial to a jury six months hence and you must be
ready.''
Salzman: The judge must do more. The judge must also
circumscribe the initial wave of discovery for both
sides. I believe that it is essential to promulgate
pattern interrogatories, discovery requests, and
documents requests.
Lundquist: Another thing the judge must do is to set limits on
trial length. I think lawyers become used to time
limits when they are set. You can go to the Supreme Court and be given a half hour on the most
important case in the world and say that's fine, because you're used to it. But if somebody says to you
that you're going to have to try a case to a jury in a
certain period of time, it gets a different visceral reaction. I think that this kind of management can
make litigation much more effective.
I agree basically, perhaps entirely, with your
Rubin:
suggestion, but I have two questions about approaching the matter from that standpoint. Suppose one or, indeed, both parties say to the judge,
"But judge, this is not that kind of case; you have it
wrong. This is just a tremendous case and I need
time; I need more than six months." How does the
judge avoid becoming tyrannical? How does he
identify whether the protests are genuine?
Salzman: I think I can give you a start on the answer.
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Perhaps the judge should become a bit tyrannical
and say, "This is the first wave. You come back to
me in three months after you have actually looked
at these documents and tell me what else you need,
why you need it, and what you're going to do. Be
prepared to explain to me why you have to put on
more than X witnesses from each defendant." Let
the lawyers come back after the documents have
been produced, after the interrogatories have been
answered.
Kirkham: I agree with these proposals with respect to certain
types of cases. Maybe we need to remember that
there are cases which really are huge such as the
IBM case and AT&T case. In those cases, unless
you are bifurcating the case, the limits are not fair
because you don't have a case that can be prepared
in six months.
Salzman: The Western Sugar casela could have been ready
for trial in a much shorter time had it been in the
interest of the parties. There were eight or ten key
dispositions, and the rest was wasted effort.
Rubin:
I think Jerry is suggesting something that I heard
best summed up by Judge Hubert Will," a great
trial judge. He said that in those situations the
judge should be reasonably arbitrary but not unreasonably arbitrary.
One last question relating to the propriety of
focusing in from the pleadings: If notice pleading is
permitted the case cannot be limited to the issues
until the issues are known; there must be some discovery, must there not, between the filing of the
pleadings and the definition of the issues?
Lundquist: It is a question of refining the definition of issues. I
think that in the broader sense an issue is present
when there is a complaint and an answer, or a complaint and the various responsive pleadings. Those
pleadings have then framed certain issues. A classic
abuse of notice pleading occurred in some cases in12. In re Sugar Antitrust Litigation, [I9771 1 TRADE
CAS.(CCH) 161,373 (MDL No.
201, N.D. Cal. fled M a y 21, 1976).
13. Hubert L. Will, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois
(senior status).

758

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I981

volving the National Football League. Once the issues were framed it was insisted that discovery be
permitted of every one of the NFL teams on things
which were not germane to the law suit but which
were customary discovery items around the rest of
the country. Now, that is where I think the judge
should start to focus in on the law suit and not allow the attorneys to pursue discovery into everything that is merely of conceivable relevance. The
problem is partially caused by judges. Judges have
too often said, "Well that's discovery and I'm not
going to get into that," and have not really paid the
attention that they should. What I would call for
probably is a little more judicial intervention to
keep discovery from exploding.
Before the others comment, let me ask one more
Rubin:
question. How do we give the judge incentive to
spend some of his time-perhaps an appreciable
amount of time-getting into the case, finding out
what the issues are, and limiting discovery?
Lundquist: A partial incentive is that if judges get into the case
early and efficiently, they will actually save themselves time. Judges who are close to the cases tend
to be the most efficient and to dispose of more
cases. Rarely will a judge who does not involve himself in the diacovery processes be an efficient mover
or trier of cases. Rather, the converse is true. Perhaps many judges wonder whether time is better
used by getting into the discovery fray or by leaving it to the magistrates. I would like to see these
judges become involved in discovery. That is what
the lawyers want. Lawyers want judges in the picture, and such involvement is more efficient for
judges in the long run.
How do you feel about it, Jerry?
Rubin:
Salzman:
I believe we need ten or fifteen specially designated
judges located in centers where complex cases are
filed. Complex cases could be assigned to those
judges. Their dockets would be limited to fifteen or
twenty complex cases. That would require the
judges to do three trials a year in addition to managing the other cases. I think this would be the
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cheapest way to do it, because judges are probably
the least expensive part of the judicial system.
They don't get paid a lot of money; neither do their
clerks. In addition, such a system would be the
most certain way to encourage legitimate settlement negotiations because the parties could not
avoid speedy trials. Appointing special judges
would also partially alleviate the burden on other
judges in those same districts, which usually have
unbearable criminal dockets. Almost all major urban centers have tremendous criminal dockets to
deal with, and these complex cases don't often
come up in rural locations. Therefore, we need to
create special judgeships. Whether these judges
would handle only complex cases during their tenure is problematic. I believe it would be best to rotate judges into the special status for three, four, or
five years, and then bring them back to ordinary
status.
Lundquist: That may be ideal, but I don't think it is realistic.
There isn't any likelihood that the Congress, the
people, or the judges will accept it. We really need
to focus more on what we can do with the existing
system and judges to solve the problem.
Rubin:
What about a system that is somewhere between
the random selection of judges and the designation
or appointment of special judges: authorizing the
chief judge of the various major districts or the
chief judges of the courts of appeals to select judges
to whom these matters would be referred based on
their presumed competence and experience.
Lundquist: I would want to think a little more about it. I have
a kind of halfway solution of my own: allowing each
attorney to peremptorily challenge one federal
judge per case. This at least gives the lawyer a little
latitude within a given district. I would like to see
that as a first step.
However, the notion of assigning cases to particular judges does exist in multidistrict litigation.
The case is assigned to a particular judge by the
panel, and generally speaking this works well. However, a little forum shopping occurs because at-
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torneys file cases in districts where they know
judges are better equipped to handle them.
Rubin:
I understand, Jerry, that your experience with the
panel has been one of delay regarding the designation of judges.
No, the panel generally acts quickly, and there are
Salzman:
several judges around the country to whom they assign these cases. But I want to create a situation in
which these judges can be relieved of some portion
of their ordinary dockets so that everybody knows
that these judges are actually going to try three
complex cases each year. Let's take some very good
judges in C h i c a g d u d g e Marshall14or Judge Will,
for example. They can't give trial dates for big
cases because it means setting aside a great deal of
time. The defendants invariably threaten a sixmonth trial, and two months is a fairly reasonable
estimate. The threat of setting a date for a trial is
not realistic because both sides know that if they
can give the judge an excuse he must accept it.
Rubin:
There is an alternative that depends again on
judicial administration. The Judge Marshalla and
the Judge Wills could be relieved of the more routine cases. Could we not use existing mechanisms to
handle both routine and complex cases rather than
create a special mechanism to handle complex
cases?
In any event, I think we need additional judgeships
Salzman:
and special courts. The statistics from the Administrative Office show that the district court judges in
urban centers have an overwhelming caseload.
Kirkham: This gets back to a very fundamental problemwork volume and income. It's disgraceful what we
pay our judges, and yet we still expect to get good
men. We need more judges, and we need to compensate them better.
Lundquist: There is no question about that. I thought that
what you were going to suggest with your center,
Jerry, was more teaching, with the judges who are
14. Prentice H. Marshall, United States District Judge for the Northern District of

Illinois.
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doing the best job sharing their information with
others. I think such an educative process could be
very helpful. It is my perception that some judges
have the personality, instinct, and knowledge to
run a better calendar, try more cases and move
more cases along. Other judges don't. The former
ought to instruct the latter. Some judges don't like
to try cases; they prefer to become managers and
settlers. Indeed, there are some interesting statistics regarding the number of cases actually tried in
certain districts. They show that some federal district judges like to try cases and, in fact, do so.
Others, seemingly, don't like trying cases at all.
Rubin:
Well, part of it is the judge's vision of himself-in
current terminology, his self-image. What does a
judge think judging consists of? If a judge's concept
of judging is to be on a bench in a black robe saying, "I sustain" or "I overrule that objection," it is
very hard to get him to move into effective pretrial
discovery. If a judge, like Judge Marshall and
Judge Will, believes that the role of the judge is to
assist in the administration of justice, then he is
apt to act differently. You have to help the judge
reshape his image of judging.
Lundquist: Having sat on a committee of lawyers and judges
that has worked on these types of problems for four
years now, I think the solution finds partial root in
education. Everyone needs to understand that lawyers like strong judicial control and early intervention. They also want the issues shaped to facilitate
the trying of complex cases. Judges have the power
to take control and probably had it before the rules
changes. It's a question of getting the judges to use
that power and to understand that lawyers want
them to use it. I think that a lot of the changes we
see are not so much changes in powers the judges
have, but in the sense of direction judges take.
Rubin:
Judicial intervention occurs at a conference that is
triggered either by the court sua sponte or by the
request of one or both parties. The mechanism by
which the judge takes control is the rule 20(0 status conference. The judge should either find out if
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the parties know what the issues are or determine
how much discovery is needed to reveal those
issues.
Lundquist: I should point out that we also tossed a little extra
leverage for the judges into rule 37(g). We said that
if the party or his attorney won't in good faith participate in framing the issues, then the judge may
charge attorney's fees against that party. So both
the stick and the carrot are there. Hopefully it will
start something going.
Salzman:
Judicial control seems to vary with the number of
parties and attorneys involved. A conference with
the judge, three lawyers on one side and two lawyers on the other side, ordinarily results in some
reasonable resolution. The parties identify the individuals whose depositions are to be taken, agree on
a schedule, and so forth. But if there are fifteen defendants and each has three lawyers at the conference, the conference takes on a different tone. It
doesn't focus on the issue of what discovery is going
to be taken, but instead focuses on the procedural
steps that will identify what discovery is subsequently going to be taken and how the parties are
going to object to the discovery. This conference
sets the stage for disagreement, and the case can go
six or seven months before the first discovery ruling, and then another three months will pass before
production.
How would you like to see that changed?
Rubin:
I think we need pattern discovery tools on the
Salzman:
model of jury instructions. Illinois has them in all
personal injury cases. As soon as the complaint is
filed, the court promulgates explicit interrogatories
and document requests that the parties are required to respond to. There could be a very nice,
limited set of court-promulgated discovery devices
about which no one can argue and to which no one
w i l l object.
Kirkham: Exactly what would those be when the plaintif€just
makes some broad, general statement that the defendant conspired to violate the antitrust laws?
Salzman: I really don't understand all this talk about the
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problems of notice pleading. I've never had any
such problem with the practice we have: we are
fairly restricted. Even the Western Sugar case was
fairly restricted in terms of the allegations. But if a
defendant were genuinely confused, the court could
legitimately ask the plaintiff, "Can't you tell me anything other than that?" If the plaintiff were unable to, the court could say, "You've got your choice:
you can ask interrogatories relating to price-fixing
or you can ask interrogatories relating to other violations, but I'm not going to give you 500 interrogatories. Here are the six or seven you can choose
from."
Lundquist: This is directly germane to what we proposed in
the latest rule change, but the Supreme Court did
not adopt it. The Advisory Committee to the Rules
Committee to the Supreme Court is entertaining
the notion of imposing a threshold limit of thirty
interrogatories; to file more than that you would
have to go to the court and explain why.
Salzman: That rule is in force in some districb, but it is
subject to avoidance. Attorneys avoid the limitation
by substituting instructions for questions. But that
is not the issue. Even if a party is limited to thirty
questions, there is no guarantee of any prompt response. Ordinarily, six months elapse before the
usual objections are resolved and another three
months before the answers are filed. In the process
of fighting about discovery, everything is compromised. Invariably, a second wave of discovery is
needed to cure the compromises. Rather than a
limitation on requests and interrogatories, we need
pattern document requests and interrogatories. I
would even suggest compulsory 30(b)(6) depositions
of certain corporate officers and defendants to identify categories of documents and modes of doing
business. Of course, these forms would be modified
as experience dictates.
In the Corrugated Carton casel%e filed five
15. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 310 (S.D.Tex. filed
Jan. 25, 1980).
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interrogatories: Who were the employees who did
business with the plaintiffs? Who saw the grand
jury transcripts? How were they dispersed? Where
are they now? What did you sell the plaintiffs? The
objections to those have taken six months to resolve. I limited myself to five because I thought I'd
get an answer in a week.
Lundquist: I'm uncomfortable when we start to talk about the
multidistrict panel cases and complex cases at the
same time. I almost regard those as different animals. Complex cases merit different treatment because they present special problems. As I listen to
us, I start to smile to myself and say, "Maybe the
best thing to do is to give up panels and not have
any multidistrict cases." No one likes the manual
any more; it's going to be redone and many agree
that it has created far more problems than it has
solved.
I have just been appointed to the Committee for
Rubin:
the Manual on Complex Litigation, so I'd welcome
any suggestions.
Kirkham: Hasn't the Committee asked Professor Miller1%
prepare a revision?
He's been employed as a consultant. I don't know
Rubin:
whether any specific directions have yet been given
to him. They may have been.
Salzman: What about having an appendix that lists
appropriate interrogatories or appropriate first sets
of interrogatories or documents?
Kirkham: The manual already includes a first "wave" of
interrogatories. These were taken from specific
cases and they worked just fine in those cases. Applied to some other case, however, they may be
monstrous.
There is another problem with the Committee's
Rubin:
proposal on limiting interrogatories: many lawyers
tell me, "Okay, I'll ask only twenty interrogatories,
but I'll take twenty more depositions. You're simply forcing me to find out some of the information I
16. Arthur R. Miller, Professor of Law, Harvard University Law School, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
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would otherwise elicit by interrogatories through
depositions-the more expensive way."
That ignores what is plainly stated: it is a threshold
limitation. The other side can agree to interrogatories beyond the threshold. If it is a choice between
interrogatories or depositions, I think the other
lawyer would agree to additional interrogatories to
avoid going through twenty depositions. If he
won't, you just say to the court, "In this kind of
case we need more." Such a rule has operated in
Massachusetts since time began. It's the rule in the
state courts in Chicago. Eighteen federal district
courts have some variation of the rule. The Committee has proposed the rule because the bar has
reported more abuse in the filing of excessive interrogatories than anything else. It's not designed to
shut out any segment of the bar or to prohibit interrogatories when they are the most efficient
approach.
I don't think an arbitrary limit of ten or twenty
interrogatories is necessarily the answer. One of the
interrogatories propounded to the Standard Oil
Company was, "If you have destroyed any paper
during the year X relating to the production, transportation, refining, or sale of oil or petroleum products, then state who wrote the document, to whom
it was sent, what the substance of it was, when it
was destroyed, and why." In my objection to that
interrogatory, I took a picture of the pile of documents that is taken each night from the Standard
Oil Building. It filled a truck. Thousands and tens
of thousands of documents were destroyed every
day, and this interrogatory called for a description.
A limitation doesn't resolve that problem.
If you need an interrogatory like that, a pattern
interrogatory would say, "Describe all documents
destroyed otherwise than in the ordinary course of
business," or "Somehow categorize the documents."
It can be done. If you get a few smart people
spending a little time, they can come up with pattern interrogatories and pattern document requests
that are as useful as pattern jury instructions, if the
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judges are educated to use them and take that kind
of control. Numerical limitations are not helpful
because they just lead to disputes about the objections. Pattern interrogatories eliminate this problem. They are proposed and discussed, and after
discussion the judge says, "These are the interrogatories and no objections will be heard. Get your answers in."
Kirkham: But you would have a court session of twenty days
just to go through a set of interrogatories.
That's if lawyers propose them. But I'm talking
Salzman:
about starting with an appendix of pattern
interrogatories.
Lundquist: I recall a federal district judge who threw out a
sheaf of eighty pages of interrogatories without
reading them. He said it was preposterous to file
eighty pages of subquestions. The courts have come
to the point where they say, "That's intolerable, we
just won't even start to read them." We need to
move toward what Jerry is suggesting.
Rubin:
Let's go back to the problem alluded to by Jerry.
At some stage you will have specific interrogatories
devised by counsel. Inevitably, objections will be
raised. The process of hearing the objections and
disposing of them is unduly lengthy and intolerably
expensive. What is the answer to that? What is a
possible solution?
One thing that is not the answer is the magistrate
Salzman:
system. In the Western Sugar case, for example,
the defendants propounded gigantic sets of interrogatories about matters that really could never
have been issues in the case. There were interminable meetings and attempts to negotiate. Neither
side wanted to negotiate, but they had to hold the
meetings for the sake of form. When the parties
sought a ruling by the court, the judge threw up his
hands and said, "Wait a second. I'll never be able
to deal with this case if I have to listen to you fellows all day and all night." Therefore, he assigned
it to a magistrate. Then, the following occurred: a
briefing schedule before the magistrate, arguments
before the magistrate, an opinion by the magistrate,
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a motion to the magistrate for reconsideration of
the opinion, rebriefing, opinion confirmed, appeal
to the court, the court stating, "On the grounds
available to me to overturn a magistrate's ruling, I
probably can't reverse, but I'll look at it any way,"
and on and on. You end up with nothing of any
value to anybody, except the benefit the defendant
derives from causing the plaintiff to expend energy.
Rubin:
What do we do about it? I hear this all the time
and I see it sometimes. What can be done?
Salzman:
Let's start with a pattern situation. The judge
propounds the interrogatories and document requests to each side as a suggestion. He's done it,
there's no objection to it, and the answers must be
forthcoming. At some point a party should be entitled to come before the judge and show why particular further document requests or particular further interrogatories are needed. It should be a
procedure without the delays that are presently inherent in the federal rules dealing with answers to
interrogatories. A person who has thirty days to answer or object always waits thirty days to object.
Then he stalls the meeting for another thirty days,
and negotiation goes on for another thirty days on
top of that. You're already at three months. An extended briefing schedule is de rigueur because a
large number of parties must coordinate. This
causes inordinate delay.
Kirkham: Jerry, you're talking about dealing with a monster
that should not have been conceived in the first
place. If the set of interrogatories is reasonably
small, you ordinarily don't have that delay.
Salzman:
I disagree. Our questions were, "Please identify
who saw the grand jury transcripts" and "Do they
still have them?" Six and a half months later we
don't have a ruling.
Lundquist: There is a difficulty with your solution, Jerry. How
does the judge get familiar enough with the case to
decide what the issues are and which pattern devices to use?
Salzman:
I'm not familiar with cases in which the issues are
so undefined. When does this happen?
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Take any class action antitrust case-any one.
The class action antitrust case breaks into two
natural parts: The issue of whether there is an appropriate class (and there are certain kinds of discovery necessary for that), and the other issues.
Most of the class action antitrust cases have been
price-fixing cases. The kinds of questions that
ought to be asked in those cases are not
complicated.
Lundquist: That is when you need a neutral person because
the defendant in that case can think of thousands
of questions which would indicate that it's not a
class or that there are all kinds of subclasses, and
the plaintiff is obviously trying to focus on questions that will give it all the ingredients of making
a rule 23 class.
Anybody who has ever tried to make use of an
Salzman:
interrogatory answer knows that those thousands of
questions are best asked by deposing the individuals from the various companies. In these cases,
there are judges who say, "Wait a second. Instead
of asking these interrogatories, which result in answers that are totally useless for a jury and which
really don't get any information you don't already
know, write up a narrative statement, one sentence
at a time, and the opposing party will either admit
it or deny it." In the alternative, the opponents can
write up a narrative statement about their
company.
Lundquist: If we are talking about the usefulness of
interrogatories, I think we all pretty much agree
that they aren't really useful. That is why I'm not
troubled with limitations or patterns. I do not
think interrogatories are useful, either as discovery
tools or at trial.
It certainly has been implicit throughout our
Rubin:
discussion that we are talking about multitiered
procedures for discovery. The relatively simple diversity automobile accident case or the Jones Act
case goes on one track, which may employ magistrates for discovery and which may be routine, and
the case that is complex or protracted goes on an-
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other track. I understand all of you to agree that, in
the latter case, the judge himself, rather than a
magistrate or some other official, ought to be giving
personal attention to discovery control, starting
with the interrogatories.
Judge Greenel7 has been using a novel device
in the AT&T case. The parties have claimed privilege on literally thousands, perhaps hundreds of
thousands, of documents. To expedite the tremendously time-consuming job of ruling on the claims,
Judge Greene has appointed two law professors as
special masters to superintend discovery. In the
case that gets beyond the time that the judge can
personally give, is that a useful device or is it a device to use once in a century?
Kirkham: On an issue of that kind it is a useful device.
Lundquist: In special instances it's probably appropriate. The
use of law school professors makes me, think about
the evidence professor who once said to his class,
"That's what the evidence cases say anyway.
Whether the trial courts follow those rules, I have
no idea; I've never been to a trial." I have a little
concern in that respect.
Rubin:
Judge Greene just handed down a ruling in which
he defined what privilege would consist of in the
AT&T case.18 The opinion gave guidelines: This
document is privileged, this is not; this is how you
identify the claimed privilege-you must attach an
affidavit concerning why it's privileged, and so
forth. Would it be helpful in complex cases, and indeed in all cases, if the judge had an individual
document about discovery generally: "This is my
discovery policy. I admit this, I exclude that. I sustain this kind of objection."
Salzman: The lawyers at our office often try to get judges to
do it in the course of pretrial conferences. They
say, "By the way, your honor, we understand so
and so is going to be raising these kinds of objections," hoping the judge can give some indication.
17. Harold H. Greene, United States District Judge for the District of Columbia.
18. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603 (D.D.C. 1980).
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Some judges say, "You know I don't give advisory
opinions." Others give indications, but they don't
make any difference because they aren't binding,
and people continue to raise objections. It's in their
strategic interest to do so, and you wind up with
the same donnybrook. What I thought would have
been interesting for Judge Greene to do in that circumstance would be to say, "I want you to categorize the types of privileged documents you have
and give me five examples of each. I will give you
some rulings on those documents. Then I will ask
you to go back and look at the other documents.
You draw your own conclusions based on my rulings. I will take any documents for which you continue to claim privilege and look at them again, but
this time there will be some penalty attached for a
wrongful claim of privilege in light of my prior
ruling."
Lundquist: Thereafter the judge should say, "I'm going to strip
issues, I'm going to add issues, I'm going to do
things that redly make the case start to take
shape."
Salzman: Judges must also penalize either attorneys or
clients for recalcitrant behavior during discovery
cases.
Kirkham: I agree with that.
Rubin:
Is good faith a defense? When we consider
penalizing attorneys or clients, the answer almost
invariably is that the attorney had a good faith belief that the objection was well founded.
Lundquist: A defense of good faith must be questioned. The
attorney is trained to reason from fact and precedent and should be held to his judgment. The idea
that Jerry suggests is intriguing. The judge says,
"I'll rule on X documents out of a hundred thousand to give you an idea of how discovery should
proceed."
I think sophisticated services like statistical
sampling could be useful to a court. One percent of
the vote can be evaluated to determine who will
win a political election. Likewise, the statistical
evaluation of documents and rulings could be very

COMPLEX LITIGATION

helpful in giving meaning to how a court will rule
on relevance, privilege, or other issues in a case. For
example, if somebody asks to look at one half million documents in a price-fixing case and the other
side replies that the request is absolutely unreasonable, that it would take X number of paralegals X
hundred hours, the court, or the parties by agreement, could appoint an auditor to go out and pull a
statistical sampling of the half million documents
requested. The parties could then come back to the
court and say, "Based on the sample I think that it
would be worth pursuing more in this area," or, "I
am satisfied that we can establish this." More sophisticated procedures could help a court make discovery rulings and determine what was needed in
enormous cases in which hundreds of thousands of
documents must be examined for statistical or accounting information.
I think we are approaching a national bar,
Rubin:
particularly in complex cases. It's highly desirable
that there not be forum shopping to facilitate discovery or to find the best judge or jury, and that
lawyers have some guidelines by which to shape
their conduct and advise their clients. Therefore,
judges ought not to fashion ad hoc rules. That
would not guarantee that every judge will rule precisely alike in every borderline situation. But if you
build a repertoire of rulings, you will find some tendency toward uniformity. The judicial process by
nature tends toward uniformity. If the judge is
presented with some objections to interrogatories of
a kind he never has considered before or with a
suggestion by counsel Lundquist that he appoint a
special master to make a sampling of documents,
the first thing he does is see what some other court
has done.
Lundquist: I think what both you and Jerry said is salutory.
When you get down to the nitty gritty, one of the
problems with discovery is that there are too few
precedents to go by: you don't have rulings, partly
because judges have stayed out of that process and
haven't given enough decisions to guide people.
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Weyman, how would you feel-and I ask you
specifically because of your role on the ABA Special
Committee on Discovery Abuse-about a massive
educational effort specifically directed at discovery
that would include judges and perhaps even feature
judges? We would hold a nationwide series of seminars on improving discovery methods and strongly
encourage state and federal judges, particularly
judges in courts of general jurisdiction, and litigating members of the bar to attend.
Lundquist: It's an exciting idea, one that I would recommend. I
have heard trial judges comment on how much they
have picked up from such an interchange, and I
think it would be progressive and helpful. One, it
would give more of a national cast to rulings, particularly in federal courts, where I think it's more
important. And two, it would provide an interchange of experience from which all participants
benefit. There remains a parochialism among lawyers, and perhaps more so, among the judges between circuits and even districts. Such an interchange could break that down.
Rubin:
To a large degree federal judges are already
educated in this manner: newly appointed judges
attend a seminar for one week or more, and more
experienced judges attend periodic seminars. There
are also seminars for state judges. But judges act
against their own background as lawyers, and they
remain members of the legal profession. I think we
need some common education that is directed on a
much broader scale to lawyers and judges together,
so that they conceptualize the problems alike and
reach a consensus about a method that does not
leave the bar, or large numbers of the bar, feeling
that, if a judge tries to adopt a management technique, he's being tyrannical or arbitrary or fighting
the customary methods of the bar.
Salzman:
This type of exchange is going on to some extent
among those judges who have multidistrict cases. I
know they discuss the issues on an informal basis
because a judge will tell you, "I was just talking to
Rubin:
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Judge PointerlBand this is what he did under these
circumstances, and it sounds pretty good to me," or
"I just talked to Judge Will and I don't care what
Judge Will did, that is not what's going to be done
down here."
The multidistrict panel has periodic meetings, I
Rubin:
believe every six months. They have two basically
different emphases. One is to talk about specific
cases, not in terms of how they are to be decided,
but where they are and what the progress is. The
other is to discuss generally techniques for handling
multidistrict cases.
Lundquist: In these panel meetings do the judges sit down and
discuss what lawyers have thought about how they
handled the cases? It seems to me that if judges
want to establish how effective they are with multidistrict cases, how quickly they can move them
along, or how innovative they can be, a little hindsight evaluation of what the lawyers who were
before them thought while they were going through
these exciting experiences would be informative.
I think every business needs consumer surveys.
Rubin:
Judges need consumer surveys too. The problem
with doing precisely what you talk about is that
generally lawyers fear they will come before a judge
again; so they want to be complimentary in some
degree, even if they think he was horrible.
We are trying something right now that will be
of interest to you. I am chairman of a subcommittee to the Committee of Court Administration that
has been charged with looking into possible alternatives to jury trials in complex protracted cases.
The Federal Judicial Center is undertaking a series
of interviews. We have selected twenty protracted
cases-cases that took a considerable amount of
time to try. Trained interviewers will personally interview the judges in each of these twenty cases.
We have a schedule for the interviewer to follow
outlining all things that should be touched on. This
19. Sam C. Pointer, United States District Judge for the Northern District of
Alabama.
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is not a question and answer check off sort of thing.
It's conducted on a personal basis, but, to be sure
the interview is thorough, the schedule calls for a
variety of inquiries into discovery, the handling of
jury charges, and other matters. Separately, we are
interviewing two lawyers in each case. If the case
involved two parties, there will be one plaintiffs
lawyer and one defendant's lawyer. If the case involved more than two parties, then we will select
counsel with diverse interests. The judges and lawyers will be anonymous, and the cases will not be
identified. We hope to get from these forty lawyer
interviews at least a sampling of lawyer reaction to
different judges and different techniques. There is
no reason why it should not be done on a broader
scale. I think it needs safeguards because of the
fear that if I say something bad about Judge Rubin
and come before Judge Rubin again, he's going to
retaliate.
Lundquist: That is a natural concern, although I think lawyers
are at least somewhat willing to run that risk.
Perhaps we should see if we've reached some
consensus. I think that education is at least a partial solution to protracted discovery. Primarily, education comes in the way Judge Rubin has suggested. However, there is nothing more instructive
than a direct sanction. When someone gets hit with
a fine or has an issue stripped, that spreads nationwide very quickly.
Rubin:
I think we have agreed that difficult cases, whether
they be complex or merely protracted, require different discovery procedures than nondifficult cases.
The first thing they require is personal attention
from the judge in some systematic way. The court's
involvement must be meaningful, not merely perfunctory. This might take a variety of forms: experimentation with standard interrogatories, standard
lists of witnesses who would be deposed in particular kinds of cases, and so on. These would be prepared not by the judge alone in chambers or in an
ivory tower, but with the assistance of lawyers experienced in this kind of litigation. Acting on those
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premises, judges and lawyers ought to be educated
in how to use discovery devices prudently and
expeditiously.
Lundquist: I certainly don't want to endorse the notion of
pattern interrogatories in any general sense, but I
would agree that in some areas certain types of pattern interrogatories would be helpful. However, I
don't think interrogatories are a high level discovery tool, and I don't think Jerry does.
Salzman:
No, I put them very low, which is why I think
pattern interrogatories are appropriate. I think
there should be very few of them for either side,
but I do think that if they are well defined we
would not have to fight about them for months.
Rubin:
Before we leave interrogatories, let me ask one
question that I have my own answer to, but I would
be interested in knowing what the rest of you think.
Lawyers who represent indigent clients or who frequently do pro bono work assert that the interrogatory is invaluable because it is the most inexpensive way to get into the lawsuit quickly. Therefore,
when they have indigent or pro bono cases that are
fairly complicated, they contend that they need to
ask numerous interrogatories.
Lundquist: I have no problem with that. If that's their best
tool, the defense lawyer ought to agree to a waiver
of any numerical limitation, and if he is unreasonable in not agreeing to it, the judge ought to give the
public lawyer the costs involved in filing a motion
to get beyond the threshold. It is simply a question
of making sure that the interrogatories are the best
tool and that they are intelligent interrogatories. If
they are the best tool, people should not be precluded from using them.
Kirkham: One very important point, I think, is that discovery
should be directed to issues that have been defined.
You have to have a lawsuit. The big problem I see
in the form interrogatories of the present Complex
Litigation Manual is that they were drafted for relatively narrow cases. If you take those same interrogatories and apply them to a case that has very
broad issues, they immediately become arbitrary.
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I am perhaps midway between you and Jerry on
that. Jerry does not, I think, see lack of issue definition as a very common problem. I see it occurring, but not quite as frequently as you do. I think
what we are envisioning in the suggestions is that,
if the issues are not clear in a case from the outset,
all discovery preliminarily must be directed to defining issues. At some stage the court has to say to
the parties or the parties have to say to the court,
"These are the issues; from now on the trial concerns these issues."
If a party must rely upon interrogatories as his
Salzman:
principal discovery device, he is in trouble. If he
thinks he is going to prove his case from interrogatories, he's dreaming. But in such a case it is no
burden to require that the opposite side respond to
the interrogatories since they are not going to be
hit with duplicative depositions.
Kirkham: Let me just say one thing here: I don't know
whether I stand alone in this, but I think one of the
real problems with complex litigation in our courts
is that certain cases should not be in the courts.
The idea should be emphasized that courts are constituted to try cases and controversies. Jerry says
that there are not many cases in which discovery is
not addressed to the issues, and that's right, but
there are some cases in which there are no issues,
for example, cases that allege general conspiracy on
the part of an industry-wide group of people. I
think the court should either use Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to force the lawyer to indicate what he wants the court to try or
simply dismiss the case. I am not quite sure how to
handle a case in which a person says he is entitled
to discovery in order to know what the issues are. It
seems to me that one must start out with some issue or the case is not triable.
Lundquist: Isn't the issue within what you just said? Didn't
you define it? The issue is whether there was a conspiracy to do something or other, and if the plaintiff says that that is the issue then the interrogatories should ask. "Did vou hold meetings on such
Rubin:
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and such a date?"
Perhaps, but I'm not certain it is that simple. Another problem in complex litigation is the rule
23(b)(3) class action. There is no way for a court to
try an antitrust price-fixing case in which there are
unlimited numbers of plaintiffs, all nonparties
brought in through a 23(b)(3) class action, and in
which the question to be determined is the amount
of damages suffered by the various plaintiffs.
Courts have tried to cope by using fluid recovery,
which, in my view, is an unconstitutional device. At
the very outset you have a case that is never going
to be tried-it will be settled. The leaders of the
bar, such as our friend Kohn,"O say that the way to
ensure that cases like that are manageable is to certify the classes, thereby forcing the parties to settle.
I don't agree with you. Our office has tried two
23(b)(3)class actions on the plaintiffs' side and several on the defendants' side. For example, our office
handled the Cast-Iron Pipe case" before Judge
Pointer. Although there were 750 to 800 class members, the judge tried the case for twelve trial class
members-three picked by the defendants, three
by the plaintiff, and six by the court. We tried it
right through damages-the whole thing.
You are stating the proposition that the only way
you can make those cases triable is to adopt an
"opt in" provision instead of an "opt out" provision. Until that is done you are not going to have
triable cases.
No. The case was tried on the basis of a selected
number of class members, and we didn't really need
to know anything about the other class members
while we were trying the case.
How do you apply the damages to the others? And
how many class members did you have?
The purchasers were chosen as class representatives
by their geographical location. We constructed a
price-line in each of the areas and had a method of

20. Harold E. Kohn; Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
21. In re Cast Iron Pipe Antitrust Litigation, No. 71-516 (N.D.Ala.).
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comparing a purchase price at a given point to the
constructed price-line. Then, the jury was asked to
determine the competitive price in the area at the
appropriate time and compare it to the price paid
to arrive at the damage figure. Let's take the Corrugated Carton case, which is a gigantic, unbelievable class action. The defendants had information
relating to the plaintiffs' purchases in their files.
From this information the jury found an absolute
minimum amount of damage a class member could
have suffered. This became the basis for a specific
damage award.
Kirkham: How did the jury arrive at the minimum?
Salzman: The same way anybody arrives a t those
figures-experts get up and jabber and the jury
makes its decision.
Kirkham: Have they proved the damage situation with
respect to each plaintiff? How many plaintiffs were
involved?
There are probably 200,000 class members. But it
Salzman:
doesn't matter what the number is because they
can each be identified from the defendants' records,
and the amount of purchases can also be determined from those records.
Kirkham: If you prove damages by sample, you haven't
proved the damages of any individual persons.
Lundquist: Although I have not tried any class actions on the
plaintiffs side to conclusion, I have been involved
in a number of cases, one with over 40,000 plaintiffs
and one right now with over 4,000 plaintiffs. We are
looking at some nationwide cases involving probably 50,000 people with individual claims. What
happens, be they class actions or major product liability cases, is that you start to develop guidelines.
You go through the same exercises after you try a
few of them. It starts to settle down; you get answers. I don't see the manageability of large class
actions as being much of a problem. When we were
defending class actions ten years ago, we said these
things were untriable, they couldn't be handled as
classes, they were unmanageable, nobody was typical. I think that position has faded a little bit.
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What has happened is that people have just
buckled under, taking samples, using fluid recovery,
and applying it across the board.
I have to disagree with you, Francis. Even in the
Rubin:
fluid recovery cases the problem can be resolved
once intelligence is brought to bear on it, if there
are paradigm or model cases. That is what lawyers
have always done, even outside the class action
context. They didn't try every automobile accident
case in which someone had a whiplash. A certain
model of whiplash cases developed and then most
settled. If you have a class action embracing 50,000
plaintiffs, you don't try 50,000 cases; you try ten or
fifty, enough to develop a model, then most settle.
Perhaps you have a few strays when the parties
can't agree that they fit a model; so you have to do
something with them.
Lundquist: The British have built so much precedent into their
damage awards that it has been recently suggested
that the judges ought to freshen up their precedential thinking by trying a few simple jury cases.
Kirkham: I think this problem could be dismissed much too
quickly because in large antitrust cases and large
class actions, the cases are not tried. Even if a test
case is brought, the verdict in the test case is res
judicata against a defendant, but the plaintiff must
still prove his damages. When you aggregate the liability and damage issues together, not all issues
are tried. We simply aggregate enormous sums.
These cases should not be brought to court: there
should not be a class action of this type.
Congress determines whether that class action is
Rubin:
tried or not tried, in the sense of being brought to
court. All we can do in this discussion is say, "Assuming Congress has decided that this is a matter
of litigation, how is it handled?"
Kirkham: I disagree because some judges will certify classes
in cases of that kind and other judges will not.
Lundquist: . You can always ask the appellate judge whether the
judge who certified the class was right in the first
instance.
Kirkham: Should we not address, then, the question of what
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type of cases should be in the courts?
Lundquist I don't see how we, as practitioners, offer solutions
to such inquiries. I haven't thought a lot about
whether substantively one type of case should or
should not be in the courts. Certainly the notion
that some kinds of cases should not be brought into
courts eliminates problems. However, we may be
building a different process-something I'm very
much against.
Let's move to a different topic. We have said that
Rubin:
the judge has his own problems. Speaking in a vein
that some of my colleagues will not approve of, I
say it is up to the judge to solve those problems;
they are not insoluble in our present system. As
some of you have pointed out, these complex cases
seldom arise in one- or two-judge districts. They
arise in metropolitan districts, and there are very
few metropolitan districts that are seriously understaffed. I don't mean judges are sitting idle; there is
plenty of work, but the districts are not seriously
undermanned the way they were ten years ago. The
problem, then, is not too few judges. I think that a
greater initiative and incentive to resolve these
problems can be found and that, when found, the
problem will become soluble.
If a judge gets a complex case that he or she
knows will take six months to try, the answer is not
to say, "I can't try this because I have a lot of criminal trials." It is for the chief judge of that district
to say, "We will reallot your criminal cases and
meet the Speedy Trial Act." Another alternative is
to get visiting judges. Hitherto, one of the practices
of the judicial profession has been to get the visiting judge to try the big case; but that's disastrous;
the visiting judge should come in and handle the
relatively routine cases to free the local judge for
ninety days or six months. We need to educate
judges about judicial administration. Perhaps we
also need greater tolerance, both among the judiciary and the bar, for the transfer of cases to other
judges when there are emergencies. As you all
know, forum shopping is undesirable. Judge shop-
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ping is undesirable. If a lawyer has a personal injury case of three days to try before judge X, or a
criminal case set for trial before judge X, and judge
X happens to be very sympathetic to civil plaintiffs
and very kind to criminal defendants, the attorney
does not want that case reassigned to someone else
just so judge X can try an antitrust case. Therefore,
the bar resists that device.
Lundquist: How do you feel about giving each attorney one
peremptory challenge against a federal judge.
Rubin:
I've discussed that idea with various people, and I
have no personal objection to it. But I am told that
in those jurisdictions that have tried it, it has not
proven to be a very useful device.
Lundquist: We have it in our state courts in California, and I
think it works well. Although it is seldom used, it is
usually used for good and valid reasons.
Kirkham: I think the bar would really like a peremptory challenge to one judge. But it's very hard to answer the
point that Judge McCree" raised when I suggested
this idea. He wondered what would have happened
down south with a peremptory challenge to Judge
Johns~n.~'
And he makes a very good point. But he
was describing a situation which should not exist in
the federal judiciary, one which hopefully no longer
exists now that certain passions and prejudices
have been tempered down a little. I think one peremptory challenge to a judge is a fair thing. Incidentally, if a case is going to be tried by the judge
rather than the jury, the question of a peremptory
challenge becomes more important.
Salzman:
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
taken a slightly different tack with some of the senior judges. That circuit has said that if a case requires more than X number of trial hours, certain
judges may not handle it. That has shifted the case
load somewhat. There is also a specific rule in the
Seventh Circuit that if, after an appeal on the sub22. Wade H. McCree, Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, Chicago,
Illinois; Former Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
23. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, Montgomery, Alabama.
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stance, a case is remanded, it must be remanded to
a different judge; it may not go to the same judge.
I would like to move to the question of jury trials in complex litigation. Our office has had experience with both cases tried by judges and cases tried
by juries. In one recent case the parties waived the
jury at the last moment and the case went to the
judge. In that case, it worked. The judge took as
active a hand in forcing the simplification of the issues as if there had been a jury, and the trial ended. But I've heard many reports of cases tried to
the court in which the judge took the usual posture-he's the judge, he'll sort it out afterwards.
That posture results in an overly long trial and a
messy record. It invites disaster that is not likely to
occur with a jury trial.
I think we have two points to focus on. One is the
desirability of trying a complex case before a judge
or a jury. That would include questions of expediting, questions which cut in favor of jury trials. A
jury trial certainly can be quickly expedited and
decided. The other point is, what are the constitutional limitations? As far as the second point is
concerned, it is important to bear in mind that
there are two kinds of complex cases. One is the
complex case within our scope of discussion for
which the seventh amendment mandates a jury
trial. The other is the complex case for which the
seventh amendment does not require a jury. In my
opinion, there is a classification of the latter kind.
The issues are sharply defined in the Ninth Circuit
decision in the United States Financial case:' and
in the Third Circuit decision in the Japanese Electronic case.'@ I think the Japanese Electronic decision is a little too narrow. It was decided on the
grounds that it would be a denial of due process of
law to submit the case to the jury, and that when
there is a denial of due process because of a jury

24. In re United States Financial Securities Litigation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
25. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
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one.
I think we should avoid discussing the seventh
Rubin:
amendment limitations because that issue is up to
the Supreme Court. Rather, our focus should be
two-fold. First, despite a constitutional right to a
jury trial, can litigants agree that certain cases
should be tried to a judge rather than a jury? And
how important is the judge's personality in obtaining such an agreement? Second, what should be
done to improve nonjury trials?
Lundquist: I am reluctant to part totally with the seventh
amendment issue because it seems to me that it is
coming down the road, and scholarly input is going
to be important with respect to what the Supreme
Court ultimately decides. But moving on to your
first point, I think if there is agreement on whether
a case should be tried to a jury, that makes it easy.
Your question of how to try nonjury cases is one
about which we can talk. However, I wonder if that
same discussion wouldn't apply to trying a complex
case to a jury.
Rubin:
An important factor in deciding whether you agree
to a nonjury trial is the personality of the judge as
viewed by the litigant.
Lundquist: That is true. There are some added risks in trial by
a judge that don't exist in a jury trial. I just tried a
case that was bifuricated-part to a jury and part
to a judge. The judge ruled against us as a matter
of law, and I think he was wrong about that, but he
took the added precaution of not believing any of
our witnesses who testified at trial. Thus, whether
he was right or wrong about.the law, he didn't have
anything to worry about. He could not do the same
thing with the part of the trial tried to the jury,
and it came out very, very differently. That is a risk
that goes with a judge's personality.
Salzman:
My training is to insist upon a jury trial unless I
have some good reason not to. Time-saving is not a
good reason. Federal jury trials are usually over
quickly. Even if jury trials took additional time, the
time invested in post-trial proceedings in order to
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secure a final judgment in nonjury trials tips the
balance in favor of juries. When we try a case to a
jury, we're probably getting transcripts daily. We
are using the transcript for the purpose of cross-examination and final argument preparation. We are
looking for material for an hour and a half presentation to the jury. However, in a bench trial, the
lawyer reads the transcript to prepare post-trial
briefs and to draft findings of fact and conclusions
of law.
Lundquist : I think the lawyer's skills are used a little better
when he's trying a case to a jury. Regardless of the
subject matter, the lawyer must present the
case-it must be intelligible; it must be direct; it
must not be overly long. The case is generally better tried to a jury, both in terms of the lawyer's
techniques and the use of demonstrative evidence,
which explains things in the best fashion. I would
give a higher mark to the lawyer's performance in
the jury trial than I would in the judge trial.
Kirkham: Just taking one point, how would you use
demonstrative evidence more effectively before a
jury than before a judge?
Lundquist: Well, when I examine an expert witness, instead of
just giving the judge something to follow, such as a
chart, I would have it blown up and developed in a
more complete manner, possibly even utilizing
colors.
Kirkham: Why is that not a good device for a judge? He has a
hard time too. That same chart could be blown up
in red and blue colors and so on. With respect to
understanding expert testimony, why shouldn't you
help the judge out? And in a complex case, if you
explain things equally well to a judge and a jury,
isn't a nonjury trial preferable? Aren't you more
likely to receive a just result from a judge?
Lundquist: No, I don't think so. I have faith in the jury.
Rubin:
It has always amazed me that lawyers don't do
what Francis suggests-make the case as clear to
the judge as they do to the jury. Perhaps it stems
from the assumption that the judge is smarter than
the jury, an assumption which may not be war-
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ranted. Perhaps lawyers assume the judge will feel
demeaned if they treat him as if he knows nothing.
I hear 140 cases a year on the court of appeals, and
in only one or two of them will a lawyer present
demonstrative evidence.
I do use demonstrative evidence before the
appellate courts. However, there is another factor
to consider in deciding whether to try a case to the
judge or the jury. I have had judges say, "Enough! I
don't want to have to hear more of this recording or
look at more of this video. I have had enough, and
the rest of it is going to be repetitive."
If you're giving the same stuff to a jury, you can be
darn sure that they will say the same thing mentally long before the judge does orally.
I don't think that is always the case.
The jurors can always lean back and close their
minds.
There is no question about that, but I think the
judge will form his ideas more quickly and cut off
the presentation sooner.
Let me ask another question. The common folklore
of the profession, perhaps not among trained litigator~but certainly in law schools and among outsiders, and perhaps even among judges, is that jury
trials take more time than bench trials. Correct or
incorrect?
I think jury trials take far less time when you
consider the post-hearing work that is required by
a bench trial.
Most judges want to see the jury fully occupied so
they make rulings in advance, decide on exhibits in
advance, and eliminate bench conferences. Indeed,
the other day Bob Hanleya6 said that in the MCIATT casea7 they had but two bench conferences
during the entire trial. It went very smoothly. Because a judge has this attitude, I think a jury trial
may be more efficient than a bench trial.

26. Robert F. Hanley; Jenner & Block, Chicago, Illinois.
27. MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F. Supp. 1072
(N.D. Ill. 1978).
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Well, lest you think I disagree with you, my own
reaction is precisely the same. I have found that, if
you take elapsed time, the time from when the
bailiff or the deputy clerk calls court to order to the
time a final decision is rendered, less time is consumed in a jury trial than there would be in a
bench trial of the same case. Lawyers do not abbreviate much in a bench trial. In a jury trial the lawyer will say, "Well, I'll leave that question out because it will bore the jury." But if it is a nonjury
trial, they don't worry about boring the judge.
Lundquist: Another problem in a nonjury trial is that the judge
will say, "I'll let that stuff in but if it's irrelevant, I
won't consider it." There is a little more latitude in
such matters during a bench trial than there is in a
jury trial.
Kirkham: But, this all applies only when the case can fairly
be tried to a jury.
Lundquistr When you say you can't try cases to juries, you are
saying there are unintelligible laws.
Kirkham: Oh, my goodness, how many cases are not tried to a
jury? Maritime cases, admiralty cases, condemnation cases-there are twenty kinds of cases that
aren't tried to juries.
Rubin:
Fifty percent of the trials in federal courts are not
tried to juries.
Lundquist: I am speaking in terms of fundamental rights, in
terms of seventh amendment rights. I believe that
in all those categories of cases arising at common
law for which we've had a right to jury trial-and I
admit there are some aberrational types of cases in
which the right did not exist at common law, but
for which the right exists now-we do and should
have a right to jury trial. It's idle to say that what
was the common law of that era is the common law
of today. It has evolved. I can't accept the notion
that cases are too complex, that one is denied due
process because a case is too complex. One of the
remarkable things in this is that you are obviously
talking about factual complexity, and I don't see
how the judge rises to the level where he is better
able to deal with factual complexity. What you are
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really saying is that the judge has superior intelligence, and that he can learn more about a technical
field than jurors can. I think that is a type of elitism which is not properly founded.
Rubin:
Do you think the notion is untrue or that it should
not be acted on as true?
Lundquist: I think it's untrue in one respect.
Kirkham: I hear you, but I can't believe it.
Rubin:
Weyman, I really don't believe that under any of
the methods we use to measure intelligence you can
say that the judge, or even the average member of
the bar, does not have a higher level of intelligence
than the average juror and does not have a higher
degree of skill in dealing with controverted facts,
listening to testimony, and so forth. Now, there
may be some very good policy reasons why we don't
want to use people of a higher degree of intelligence, but that is a different concern.
Lundquist: I'll accept that, but what I'm saying is that when a
factual matter comes before a jury there are six or
preferably twelve people who bring a composite of
intelligence and experience to bear on the matter.
That composite of intelligence and learning which
comes from the jury-and
I probably used the
wrong words in confining it to "intelligence9'-is totally desirable when dealing with complex issues.
Rubin:
Do you prefer as a policy matter, and perhaps as a
constitutional matter, the pooled judgment of six
typical people over that of one person who might
have superior background, training, or intellect?
That seems like a perfectly good value judgment.
Kirkham: That is a good value judgment in those cases in
which both groups have the capacity to understand
and decide the issues on the merits.
Salzman:
I don't think you can safely assume that a judge
has a greater capacity to make a fair decision than
a jury does. I am convinced that in most cases the
judge's background and experience cause him to be
predisposed toward a particular view. If you are on
the losing side to start with, you are not going to be
able to convince him during the trial. There is a
much better chance of convincing a jury of what is
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right.
Rubin:
How do you respond to the type of interview that I
have seen published in the New York Times and
the Wall Street Journal. They interview all the jurors who serve on a celebrated complex case, and
every one of them says, "I didn't understand it. I
wish I had not been chosen to decide it."
Lundquist: I tried two complicated cases to juries this year, one
involving a lot of chemical processes, engineering
testimony, building construction issues, and esoteric liability questions. Some products used to
send rockets to the moon exploded. The jurors
came out of a southern county and included some
engineers, some FAA inspectors, a former police officer, and a good number of housewives. That jury
was absolutely as competent to make a determination of the numerous factual issues on which they
heard divergent expert testimony as the judge or
any of the lawyers were.
Kirkham: Your statement, "That jury was just as competent
to decide those issues as the judge," is an opinion,
and I wonder if it is true. I talked to a little Norwegian woman that sat on a jury up in Seattle. The
case involved "split-pump" operations by service
stations. That is a trade term describing the selling
of two brands of gasoline at the same service station. She said, "But what I don't know, Mr. Kirkham, is how you can sell gasoline out of a split
pump." This, after weeks of trial.
Lundquist: Those things do happen with juries in bad
situations. But whenever you interview the jury in
those situations, you find that the confusion is
caused by lawyers. Take, for example, some recent
litigation in Chicago. The litigation was complicated because it had to do with takeovers and antitrust defenses. The case was dismissed after three
or four weeks of trial. Someone talked to a juror
who said, "I was listening for this anti-'rust' defense and I wondered what was 'rusting'." It is obvious who was at fault: the lawyers.
The Federal Judicial Center is trying to develop
Rubin:
some data in districts that have tried complex
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cases. They will begin by taking a cross-section of
potential jurors. Next, they will try to get a profile
of each person, including his education, background, occupation, skills, occupational level, and
so forth. They will then determine how the profile
of the jury selected in the average noncomplex civil
case compares to the average person in the jury
wheel. Finally, they will see how the profile of the
person selected as a juror in the complex case compares to the profile of the average juror in the
wheel. Now, all of us have some suppositions about
which jurors a lawyer will challenge peremptorily
and why. We also have suppositions about which
jurors a judge will excuse for cause and why. We
have been told, for example, that many professional
people do not serve on juries in complex cases because of the length of the trial. Their schedules
would be too disrupted, so they are excused for
cause. Maybe those same people are excused for
cause in simple cases. Maybe they are challenged
peremptorily. At any rate, if we are able to find out
all this data, at least we will know whether we get
the same kind of juries in complex cases as we get
in simple cases, and whether either, or both of
them is much like the cross section of the voting
population from which most jury panels are drawn.
Lundquist: I would suggest another area of inquiry, although I
think I know how it comes out. I would guess that
if the lawyers who have tried a reasonable or substantial number of jury cases were polled, the results, on the side of both4the plaintiff and the defendant, would show that these lawyers are almost
uniformly of the view that no case is too complex to
be tried to a jury. I find that the people who take
the other point of view have not had a lot of jury
experience.
Kirkham: What kind of cases have they tried, Weyman? Take
the IBM cases, five of which were tried to a jury.
Three resulted in hung juries, and the other two
were decided by directed verdict before they went
to the jury. No jury has come in with a verdict in
an IBM case yet. Did you talk to those lawyers, and
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did they say they preferred a jury trial?
Lundquist: I could tell you about a substantial number of lawyers who, after having tried a number of antitrust
cases, have a great deal of faith in the jury. In Los
Angeles, for example, are Joe Ballls and M a x
Blecher,19who are on opposite sides. They certainly
have a lot of faith in juries. I could give you other
examples from all parts of the country.
Kirkham: Aren't you really talking about cases that all of us
would concede are triable before juries?
Lundquist: I raised a different question. I am asking whether
the lawyers who try jury cases think all cases are
triable to juries. And I think the answer is yes.
Those who are opposed to it are lawyers who have
tried very few jury cases. Indeed, if I had only tried
one or two jury cases and had been hit for hundreds of millions of dollars, I would not like juries
either.
Weyman, what you say is correct. But I wonder if it
Rubin:
is not like asking a surgeon about surgery. A member of my family had a lump on the breast, and
before we had anything done I made some inquiry.
The best doctor I talked to said, "If the growth is
malignant, don't go to a surgeon unless you want
surgery. Go to someone else if you want chemotherapy or some other type of treatment. Surgeons believe in surgery." Well, lawyers who have tried
cases before juries believe in juries. Even if they
have a bad result, they merely say, "The jury went
wrong, but next time it'll do it right." So I don't
know whether a general belief is necessarily
objective.
Lundquist: The way you have posed the question makes it a
little tough; whether you should have surgeons involved in the process of deciding whether to eliminate surgery totally or just in certain cases is more
akin to my position.
Rubin:
Are there other alternatives? Could we have a
three-judge panel that involved either a judge and
28. Joseph A. Ball; Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, Long Beach, California.
29. Maxwell M. Blecher; Blecher, Collins, & Hoecker, Los Angeles, California.
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two special masters, or three judges? Would that be
inferior or superior to a jury, or should that not be
considered at all?
I don't see how having three judges is any different
from having one. You are still presenting the case
to somebody who has a particular type of training
and a fairly consistent background. Most judges are
not too different from one another-they live in the
same neighborhood, they come in on the same bus.
Jerry, now that we have recovered from the shock
of the suggestion, let's put it in context. We are not
talking about having three judges in cases that can
be tried to juries; we are talking about using them
in extraordinary cases like the Japanese Electronic
case or the United States Financial case. Most reasonable people, I hope, would think that these cases
are not triable to a jury. Why in that exceptional
case shouldn't there be two or three judges? It
wouldn't be a great burden on the judiciary because
it would be the exception, the rare case.
Tell me, which type of case is extraordinary? What
things would make it necessary for a case to be
tried before a panel of judges?
That is a judgment the courts would have to make.
They are capable of making such decisions. I think
a reasonable decision can be made as to whether a
case can be understood by a jury of laymen. Once
that has been established, as it has been in the
Third Circuit, then why not use two or three judges
instead?
If a case is too complex for a jury to understand,
the complexity arises out of technical and mechanical issues, issues the judge is no better equipped to
understand than the jury is.
Not necessarily. The case can be very protracted; it
can involve a multitude of issues. In those situations a judge can segment a case; he can have a recess in the middle.
He can do that in front of a jury.
For six months to a year?
He should be able to break the case down into
issues that can be dealt with.

792

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I981

Lundquist: I heard a very respected federal district judge ask
the other day (and I don't know where he comes
down on this issue): "What makes people think I
can absorb 100,000 documents or the testimony of
X number of experts on all kinds of factual issues."
To let a case get that complex is to overload the
talents of the most industrious and astute judge.
Kirkham: A .case that complex cannot be decided by the
tribunals our civilization supplies.
Salzman:
The answer to that is contained in the practice
followed by most good trial lawyers in the Northern
District of Illinois. They say, "If I can't put this
case on in three weeks, I am probably going to lose.
If the defendants want to take six months, good
luck."
Kirkham: You cannot put on a case like the United States
Financial case or the Japanese Electronic case in
three weeks. There are just too many issues.
Lundquist: That is a self-fulfilling prophecy. As long as you say
it is too complex, that there are too many issues,
one side wins because they obviously want the nonjury result and they will string the case out to get
that result. On the other hand, if, as Judge Rubin
suggested earlier, both sides are told that in two
years the case is going to trial, they will focus in
and decide what really is going to carry the day.
Kirkham: You are not talking about reality. Examine the
records in the United States Financial or Japanese Electronic cases. Read the opinions of the
judges. See what those cases involved. Then decide
whether it is possible to try those cases in three
weeks, if the complexities are being overstated. You
cannot just dispose of this problem by saying that
no case is too complex. That is the approach the
Ninth Circuit took. I think it is overly simplisitic.
Lundquist: I am familiar with some of the lawyers and judges
in those cases. I have my views as to what they
were doing and why.
Let me ask if we have some ideas about another
Rubin:
aspect of complex cases. Assuming we have a jury
trial, are there ways in which the trial process can
be improved so as to increase jury understanding
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and expedite the trial? Some suggestions have been
made: (1) the judge should give a preliminary
charge on the law at the start of the trial so the
jurors will know what to look for; (2) the jury
should be allowed to take notes; (3) the judge's
charge should be given to the jury in writing, and
they should be permitted to take it into the jury
room.
Lundquist: Don't forget notebooks for the jury.
Kirkham: I agree with all of those suggestions. I also advocate
allowing juries to ask questions during the trial, always through the court of course.
Lundquist: I would not go along with that.
In the Corrugated case, Judge Singletona0had a
Salzman:
booklet prepared, printed, and given to each juror.
The booklet defined all the terms and identified the
companies and participants. The jurors had their
booklet with them at all times, and the plaintiffs
reinforced that technique by the use of slides.
Whenever somebody's name was mentioned, a
paralegal projected a slide identifying the person,
together with his employment history.
Rubin:
The device that Jerry suggested can be very useful,
not only with regard to technical terms, but with
photographs, exhibits, the preliminary jury charge,
or other instructions before the jury. It's relatively
inexpensive to reproduce those documents.
There was some difference of opinion on
whether the jury should be permitted to ask questions. Why don't we explore that?
Lundquist: The problem is that the lawyers have in mind what
they want to do: each side is trying to educate. It is
like when I give a lecture at Dartmouth. At times it
is inappropriate to take questions. Often, one question throws everyone off, and indeed even in the
open sessions, I find that many students come in
and say, "That question was off the mark; it didn't
interest the rest of us." I think it is better to go
through with what the lawyer has to present and
not to allow one concern to be overly elevated. Be30. John V. Singleton, Jr., Chief Judge for the Southern District of Texas.
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sides, some people are afraid to ask questions. Further, if in the course of the trial the lawyer makes
what is kind of a continuum of opening statement-that is, if when he comes to a different
phase of the testimony the lawyer explains what is
going to happen in that phase-many of those jurors' questions will be answered.
What do you think of questions by the jury, Judge
Rubin?
I have always asked jurors to be very careful about
asking questions because the lawyers have a certain
order of trial. I instruct the jurors that if they have
some question they really think is important, they
should write it out and hand it to the marshall.
Therefore, I have had very few questions submitted
during the course of trial. But I think opinion varies widely on this matter. Some judges and trial
lawyers say, "Let the jury ask questions. If it's on
their minds, we might as well know about it."
I analogize the situation to an appellate argument.
Every lawyer likes to stand up and go through that
remarkable discourse he has prepared. He resents a
judge's interruption. But believe me, if he doesn't
take that question and answer it, he is going to lose.
The worst question that I ever heard propounded
by a juror was one that was blurted out. One of our
more celebrated trial attorneys, who thinks he has
a certain amount of appeal to female jurors, was
engaged in doing the thing for which he was celebrated. Right in the middle of some histrionic argument, one female juror said, "Why don't you sit
down and shut up?"
Arguing a case before a jury is not like an appellate
argument because the lawyer does not always control his ability to answer the question. There may
be witnesses who will testify to issues A, B, and C.
The first witness may testify to A and C but not B,
and B may be the issue of interest to the jury at
that point.
In cases involving separate issues, we do have a
great problem with the jury trial. The Supreme
Court has decided that you may sever issues in a
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jury trial, but it has never held that you may submit a second issue to a different jury. Assuming
that could be done, would it be a useful device to
be able to sever issues in a jury trial and assemble a
different jury for each issue rather than just go
straight through the whole trial?
Salzman:
It makes a certain amount of sense in some
situations. For example, it could be used when the
proof of damages would occupy more than thirty
percent of the trial time. If the case takes three to
five weeks to try, and if the proof of damages is going to take another three weeks, severance may
prove useful. I have seen this proposed, but when it
came close to trial, the attorneys would always say,
"These issues cannot be separated because the
facts that pertain to issue one go to issue two, and
it is only going to take an extra fifteen percent of
the time. We might as well have the jury decide
both of them."
Are there any other things we want to say about
Rubin:
complex cases at the trial level? If not, we might
try to answer some questions about whether complex cases offer any particular problems at the appellate stage.
Lundquist: One thing that strikes me about complex cases a t
the appellate level is the bar's acceptance of the
firm limitations as to brief length and type of argument. I don't have any trouble accepting that. To
me, the limitations generally make a lot of sense.
And yet, I am surprised to see how lawyers can accept the appellate process as a compressed process
when they assert that some aspects of trial are so
difficult that they have to be handled in an openended time frame. Perhaps people are more accustomed to having rules at the appellate level than
they are at the trial stage.
Do you accept the proposition that there is an
Rubin:
almost one hundred percent appeal rate on complex cases that go to final judgment?
Lundquist: I would accept the proposition that notices of
appeals are filed in almost one hundred percent of
the cases; I would not accept the proposition that
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almost one hundred percent of those cases go
through to an appellate determination.
Salzman:
We have had a couple of small complex cases, that
is, cases in which not many attorneys were involved
even though the issues were complex and even
though they were class actions on behalf of all holders of commodities contracts. And in those cases
which the defendant won by a jury verdict and in
which the judge had, I think, essentially given the
plaintiffs their head, the plaintiffs were out of luck
on an appeal. They were responsible for substantial
costs and expenses, and they were willing to forego
the appeal for forgiveness of those costs and expenses. Those cases never were appealed.
Lundquist: I see a lot of complex cases settled after
determination at the trial stage. In other cases,
there is a lot of maneuvering back and forth
through the appellate process. But aren't some appellate cases now starting out with a kind of settlement conference?
The Second Circuit has such a procedure. They use
Rubin:
a commissioner, who is a lawyer of considerable
experience.
Salzman:
New York state courts also seem to follow such a
procedure.
Kirkham: Before we finish, we ought to discuss incentives and
disincentives to saving time. Then, we should try to
sum up.
One thing I would like to mention is the notion of
Salzman:
prejudgment interest in order to discourage stalling
by certain defendants. The interest should be calculated at a genuine rate. The only problem with
that idea is that it presumes there is going to be a
judgment. And it presumes that any settlement will
take into account, in addition to actual damages,
the amount of prejudgment interest that would
have been earned if there had been a judgment at
the time. But, I think it would be some incentive to
avoid unnecessary protraction of cases.
Lundquist: Another observation which doesn't follow on that,
but which I have heard a number of times, is that
trial lawyers tend to approach discovery differently
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than what I describe as "litigators," and as a consequence you tend to get lower costs when a trial lawyer is involved. Even in the personal injury defense
bar some lawyers who represent insurance companies have not tried a case in years. I would classify
such lawyers as litigators. Litigators go on a much
more elaborate discovery route. I don't know that
the results are different. But that approach is starting to emerge. Until now we have thought of the
trial and litigation bars as one and the same. I have
some question as to whether they are.
Rubin:
Let me ask a different question. In large part I
think we agree that a good deal can be done to alleviate problems of complex litigation by having a
certain type of judge who has a certain type of interest and incentive and, I presume, a certain type
of background and skill. Are we getting trial judges
who are capable of carrying out this mission?
Lundquist: That is becoming a problem because of the income
level of judges, at least where I have practiced-Boston, San Francisco, and Alaska. In the
past, there have been many very fine judges a t both
the federal and the state court levels, but it is a
problem now. We are in danger of losing those
types of people.
Salzman:
I see it a little differently in the Northern District
of Illinois. Good people are becoming judges, really
spectacular people. But I don't think those people
view it as a lifetime career the way it was formerly
viewed. I think it is seen as a five- or seven-year
career stop that is going to enhance your value as
an attorney when you are done. You make certain
short-term financial sacrifices for which you are
awarded certain long-term financial benefits.
Kirkham: You have answered the question in the negative
then, haven't you? There is a threat to a competent
federal judiciary.
Salzman:
No. The question is, is it like the army, where the
first four years are training and the next twenty
years are productive? Are we getting enough years
out of these people who serve only seven to nine
years? My guess is that we are. Maybe it is not so
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bad to have a rotation like that on the federal
bench.
I don't think the problem is exclusively a federal
Rubin:
one because, as we all know, approximately ninety
percent of all the cases tried in this country are
tried in state courts.
Lundquist: But, I would disagree with Jerry. I would like to see
the bench become the pinnacle that one could
achieve professionally. It should not be a way stop
to a greater economic career. If that is the motivation people have for becoming judges, we are in a
little danger already. I don't feel judges should be
the highest paid segment of the profession, but
they certainly should be paid enough so that when
that pay is added to the other emoluments and responsibilities that go with the job, it attracts good
people to the pinnacle.
Perhaps pay is not the sole criterion. There may be
Rubin:
other things about the nature of the judicial role
that tend, quite apart from direct compensation, to
be attractive or unattractive to successful
practitioners.
Kirkham: That is true, but they should not be penalized for
letting that high quality of devotion direct their
path.
Think
of the difference between the urban districts
Salzman:
and the rural districts. In North Dakota $54,000 is
not an inconsiderable sum compared to what other
practitioners in the area make, but in New York
City you can't afford to ride the subway on that
salary.
Kirkham: Don't overlook the fact that the per diem a judge
receives when he goes to another area does not even
pay his hotel room.
Lundquist: That has always been a problem. When the federal
judiciary was well compensated, the North Dakota
judges were extremely well compensated.
Some of you gentlemen are being a little provincial
Rubin:
about what lawyers in small towns are able to make
now. When I say small towns I don't mean a town
of 10,000, but communities of 300,000 and 400,000.
I know by what people tell me what starting law-
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yers and successful practitioners make in towns of
that size.
If it is agreeable to the rest of you, perhaps we
could each take a moment to sum up our views. I'll
begin.
In summary, I would like to return to the point
I made earlier. One of the real problems with our
courts today is that we have cases in the courts that
should not be there. As far as the complex case is
concerned, there should not be a rule 23(b)(3) class
action available with an opt-out provision. An optout provision creates untriable cases that are resolved only by settlement. Often these settlements
are extorted and unfair. Our system simply does
not furnish a forum for the just resolution of those
cases. If you took rule 23(b)(3) cases out, or converted it to an opt-in rule, then a very large percentage of complex litigation problems would be
eliminated.
A related problem is the filing of suits for
which the attorney and the client have no real basis. Because they hear some rumor that the United
States is investigating some company, they immediately jump in and file a lawsuit. It has been suggested here that perhaps a lawyer has an obligation
to do that because the statute of limitations is running. I disagree. Courts are formed for the purpose
of trying law suits; and if a person doesn't have a
law suit, doesn't know what the issues are, and
doesn't know how his client is hurt and by whom,
then he ought not to file the suit. The lawyer ought
not to file pleadings, untruthfully certify under rule
11 that they are filed in good faith, and then resort
to discovery to try to find a cause of action.
I also very strongly believe that there are certain types of complex litigation that should not be
tried by juries and cannot be tried by juries in accordance with due process of law. Beyond that I
think the single most important thing we have said
today is that to solve the problem of complex litigation, we need a strong judge who will immediately
take charge of the case, frame the issues, and con-
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fine discovery to the issues. The judge should set
target dates and determine as soon as reasonably
possible whether the trial will be to a jury. A good
strong judge will make a real difference.
Lundquist: I guess I have summarized throughout, but I cannot
say that I am really one hundred percent, or even
much more than seventy-five percent, with Francis.
However, let me say that I think the problems are
probably more internal. Many lawyers abuse the
system. This has come to bother courts, clients, and
the public. I think lawyers have to look very hard
at their responsibilities. Indeed, what the ABA Special Committee on Discovery Abuse is pushing for
is to have lawyers certify at every step of the way
that things are done in good faith. This is necessary
because lawyers do practice in a conflict situation.
Maurice Rosenburg31and others have observed that
discovery and the coincidence of big firms starting
to charge hourly fees for everybody, including
paralegals, have put an unnatural strain on the conflict position of lawyers. So I think the profession
has to, and I think it is starting to, do some things
in that respect. With that attention from the profession and with an involved judiciary, we have the
ability to solve most of the problems in the next
decade, not in a perfect way, but in enough of a
way so that people continue to respect the system.
I don't like the idea of eliminating cases from
our court systems. I think one of the geniuses of the
American judicial system, both federal and state, is
that it operates as sort of a social roller-bearing in
which people are able to litigate their disputes. I t
has been an enormous outlet for people. Lawyers
should not care about not being liked as long as the
system is working. And I think it has worked in this
country in an exemplary fashion. While it needs reform, that reform should be along the lines we have
talked about: quick trials, strong judicial administration, and lawyers who exercise their judgment so
31. Maurice Rosenberg, Harold R. Medina Professor of Procedural Jurisprudence,
Columbia University, New York, New York.
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that they are not conducting abusive, redundant
discovery.
I think the possibility of eliminating the problems
of complex cases through self-policing is slight. We
might make some headway with prejudgment interest. Also, some progress may be made by disciplining attorneys or their clients for inordinate delays,
improper objections, and bad-faith stalling tactics.
I agree that we have to look for an active hand
from judges, but this does not mean that we need a
lot of status reports and a lot of hearings. Such procedures do not encourage the winding up of a case,
but often breed greater complexity. When lawyers
know the judge is willing to listen, rather than supply direction, they can turn a slip-and-fall case into
a complex one.
I do not agree that rule 23(b)(3) creates cornplex litigation. However, I do not believe in rule 23
cases anymore. Our firm would be happy to do
them if we were the only firm involved, but we
don't want to occupy our time with gigantic cornmittees of plaintiffs. My personal experience is that
the recent cases, many of which have been settled,
are not blackmail cases. If anything, the total
amount achieved in settlement is substantially less
than the amounts that would have been achieved
had many of the large class members filed and pursued their own litigation. The judicial costs would
have been greater, there would have been many
more cases filed, and the cases would have been
more complicated.
With respect to rule 11 and its place in simplifying litigation, I am going to go along with Francis
and say that I believe rule 11 could be enforced
more sternly. A judge should say, "I am going to
give you a month, but this motion is pending. If
you don't have something by the end of the month,
you are going out the window on a rule 11motion."
However, I don't believe there are that many law
suits that would be subject to a rule 11 motion.
Most law suits that are subject to rule 11 motions
have been brought for political purposes by individ-
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uals who had to protect certain types of interests
for the groups of people they were representing.
Perhaps there are some complex cases that
cannot be tried to a jury, but I have not seen them.
Francis has mentioned some, and he sounds as if he
is right, but such cases don't often come across my
desk. I believe that the jury is very useful and that
if a litigator thinks he has to try his case before a
jury, he begins to think earlier about which witnesses he can actually use. Some think that forcing
a lawyer to do this is not fair. I think however, that
such choices are part of life in these United States,
and it is not a bad system.
Yesterday, I finished fourteen years on the bench,
of which twelve were rather busy trial court years. I
have seen a relatively small number of cases filed
that a conscientious, honorable advocate would not
file. I believe I have seen at least an equally small
number of cases defended that an honorable, conscientious advocate would not defend, or at least
not in the way the cases were defended. I don't believe that any major part of the problems faced by
courts in this country is caused by lawyers instituting or defending litigation that should not be instituted or defended. We do have a problem in that
area, however, and we are all aware of it. It is a
problem with which the new ABA Commission on
Professional Responsibility has dealt. Should the
lawyer's duty to his client be the major or, indeed,
the sole controlling rule of behavior, or does the advocate owe other duties to society? By and large we
are very timorous about doing anything that supplants the paramount duty to the client. Therefore,
I don't think we are likely, either as a self-policing
matter or as a judicial matter, to do much about
enforcing rule 11 sanctions through the dismissal of
law suits or defenses.
It seems to me that in complex cases what we
have is, to use exactly the same term, a complex
problem. The problem is brought about by a host
of causes, some of which are societal in nature:
What does society look to the courts to decide?
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Some are caused by the judge's role in litigation.
Others are brought about by the development of
what has accurately been called the "litigation industry." These problems are not capable of simple
solution. We are not going to solve them by limiting
the number of interrogatories or by several changes
in the federal rules. The solution will be found by
trying to deal with many of the things that contribute, by their interaction and by their dynamics, to
the problem.
One thing I think we have all agreed on is that
a complex case is a slightly different species of litigation than the typical case. It deserves a different
track, a different kind of treatment. It requires a
different kind of attitude by all of those concerned.
We have a system in which, laudably, judges are
chosen from the profession. They are familiar with
the problems of the profession, but they also bring
with them the limitations of the profession. They
bring with them attitudes and perceptions that are
typical of the profession. So part of the problem in
dealing with the judge's perception of his role is
dealing with the profession's perception of that
role. This I think requires acceptance of the notion
that the complex case requires special management:
it must be tailor-made management; it has to employ some accepted devices that might be uniform,
but each case has to be taken individually; and the
lawyers have to accept and tolerate a degree of judicial intervention that perhaps would be unacceptable in other cases. This also requires that the bar
take a different role in these cases. In addition to
accepting judicial management, lawyers must have
some understanding of the nature of the problem.
They must understand that the escalation of litigation costs is a matter of public concern even if both
parties are willing to expend unlimited amounts.
Litigation cost is public business. It reflects on our
system for controversy disposition. I think we need
broad, massive professional reeducation. We need
to reeducate judges and magistrates, both state and
federal, and people actively engaged in litigation.
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Finally, I think we need some incentive for
quality performance in the judicial role. All of the
measures now taken to evaluate judicial performance are objective and statistical: How fast do the
cases come to trial? How many cases did the judge
dispose of? and so forth. We have no method by
which we can measure good judging and bad judging, or quality performance versus nonquality performance. Like everyone else in our society, judges
respond to incentives. Those incentives must not be
monetary, but I think we ought to give some professional attention to devising ways to measure
quality and to encourage quality.

